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Abstract
In conventional mobile crowdsensing (MCS) applications, the crowdsensing server
(CS-server) needs mobile users’ precise locations for optimal task allocation,
which raises privacy concerns. This paper proposes a privacy-preserving task al-
location framework (called P2TA) for edge computing enhanced MCS, focusing
on optimize task acceptance rate while protecting participants’ privacy by intro-
ducing edge nodes. The basic idea is that edge nodes act as task assignment
agents with privacy protection that prevents an untrusted CS-server from access-
ing a user’s private data. We begin with a thorough analysis of the limitations of
typical task allocation and obfuscation schemes. On this basis, the optimization
problem about location obfuscation and task allocation is formulated in consid-
eration of privacy constraints, travel distance and impact of location perturba-
tion. Through problem decomposition, the location obfuscation subproblem is
modeled as a leader-follower game between the designer of location obfuscation
mechanism and the potential attacker. Against inference attack with background
knowledge, a genetic algorithm is introduced to initialize an obfuscation matrix.
With the matrix, an edge node makes task allocation decisions that maximize task
acceptance rate subject to differential and distortion privacy constraints. The ef-
fectiveness and superiority of P2TA compared to exiting task allocation schemes
are validated via extensive simulations.
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Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) [1], a type of emerging human-powered sensing
paradigm, leverages millions of individual mobile devices to sense, collect, and
analyze urban data without deploying a large number of static sensors as sensing
infrastructures. Due to its low cost and spatial-temporal coverage, MCS serves as
a critical building block for various Internet of Things (IoT) applications [2] from
air monitoring [3] to localization [4] and intelligent transportation [5]. On an MCS
system, mobile users as task participants are registered as candidate workers who
collect and contributes data through sensing devices (e.g. smart phones, smart
glasses and smart watches) they carry. Once a new task arrives, the crowdsensing
server (referred as CS-server) selects some workers to go to prespecified places to
complete certain tasks (i.e. task allocation [6]) by incentives [7].
Because of diverse qualities of participants on different tasks, task allocation
is critical to an MCS platform, the efficiency of which depends mostly on location
information to calculate the distances between tasks and workers. The longer the
distance from a user to the target location of a task, the greater the rewards of
completing the task; the shorter the travel distance, the more likely the user is to
accept the task and the fewer rewards the CS-server should pay. A number of
researchers (e.g. [8, 9]) make an assumption that users’ locations are known to
the CS-server for better task allocation. However, these location information may
fall in the hands of an untrusted CS-server. Even with incentives, concerns about
privacy leakage and security threat will discourage users from engaging in MCS.
Thus, location privacy preservation should be jointly taken into account in MCS
task allocation.
Existing location privacy protection mechanisms (e.g. spatial cloaking [10],
dummy [11], perturbation [12] and encryption [13, 14]) designed in the context
of location-based services (LBSs) are not directly tailored for MCS task alloca-
tion. First, these mechanisms may reduce the availability of data received due to
the need to falsify or modify the location or submission time of data collected.
Second, in contrast to LBS which focuses mainly on the enhancement of a user’s
privacy, the optimization of MCS task allocation requires a comprehensive con-
sideration of the interaction between privacy protection and travel distance. Third,
due to the large number of users and tasks, privacy-preserving task assignment re-













from the user-centric privacy protection mechanism which locally runs on a user’s
mobile device. These constraints and challenges make privacy-preserving MCS
task allocation a challenging issue.
Thanks to the emergence of edge computing [15, 16, 17], it is promising to
achieve privacy-preserving task allocation by deploying between users and the
CS-server. The basic idea behind edge computing enhanced MCS is to perform
computations at the edge of the network as an anonymous server and a task al-
location agent. The potential advantages mainly include three aspects. First, a
user’s real location can be replaced by an obfuscated location by an edge node
before uploading. Second, the decentralized and switchable nature of edge nodes
helps avoid many potential privacy exposure risks. Third, edge nodes are closer to
users, which helps improve the real-time performance of task assignment and user
response. Last but not least, edge nodes typically do not suffer from computation
and storage performance bottlenecks when they undertake privacy protection and
task assignment. Yet in spite of these advantages, many private things still can
be deduced form the obfuscated locations when a malicious attacker holds certain
prior knowledge. If there are no countermeasures against such inference attack,
privacy guarantees provided by edge nodes will be downgraded.
This paper proposes a privacy-preserving task allocation framework (P2TA)
for edge computing enhanced MCS, where edge nodes act as agents to obfuscate
locations uploaded by users and assign tasks to proper users. The focus is on
maximizing task acceptance rate while achieving an efficient tradeoff between
privacy level and travel distance. The main contributions include:
1. To begin with, we compare user-centric and task-centric task allocation ap-
proaches and analyze the impact of location obfuscation on task assignment.
On this basis, we formulate the optimization problem regarding maximizing
task acceptance rate and providing privacy guarantees.
2. The optimization problem is divided into obfuscation-based privacy game
subproblem and task allocation subproblem. The former is constructed as
Stackelberg privacy game between an edge node and a potential attacker
on the CS-server with adversarial prior knowledge to run inference attack,
where distortion and differential privacy constraints are considered. A ge-
netic algorithm is applied to generate an appropriate initial value for loca-
tion obfuscation. For the latter, a linear programming is built with objective
of maximizing task acceptance rate with the obfuscated locations.
3. Through extensive simulations that P2TA outperforms typical task alloca-













ficiency. In particular, our results indicate that when inference error is 1km
and differential privacy budget is 0.3, the task acceptance rate reaches its
maximum with an appropriate privacy level.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
briefly introduce the related works, followed by our motivation in Section 3. Sec-
tion 4 gives the edge computing assisted system framework. Section 5 introduces
key performance metrics and formulates the optimal task allocation problem. Sec-
tion 6 decomposes the optimal problem into two sub-problems to be solved, fol-
lowed by performance evaluation in Section 7. Concluding remarks and the re-
search prospect are illustrated at the end.
2. Related Works
While some of research works support privacy-preserving task allocation, they
may not applicable in an actual scene because of the lack of consideration of user
travel distance. Spatial cloaking (e.g. [18, 19, 20]) is a widely used strategy for
protecting location privacy. The main drawback is that tasks are likely to be re-
jected because of long travel distance. Shokri et al. [21] propose to generalize the
precise locations of users into a confused region that protects location privacy. As
a matter of fact, generalizing area to allocate task is the same as random allocation.
While Haze [22] can provide k-anonymous guarantee with statistical information,
its task allocation efficiency is limited in precision. In [23], proxy reencryption
and BBS+ signature are introduced to prevent privacy leakage. Despite the im-
plementation of anonymous submission, it is possible to make an incentive mech-
anism difficult to run. LORR [24] is a 2-stage and user-controlled obfuscation
scheme, which can improves both privacy gain and objective recommendation
quality.
Relatively little research considers task acceptance rate in presence of privacy
constraints. Wang et al. [25] proposes a user-centric obfuscation method for task
allocation, where travel distance and privacy constraints are taken into account.
iCrowd [26] is a generic task allocation framework with energy-efficient piggy-
back, in consideration of different incentive and coverage constraints. The work
in [27] addresses the multi-task allocation problem with task-specific minimal
sensing quality thresholds, aimed at assigning an appropriate set of tasks to each
participant. The work in [25] increases user acceptance rate by minimizing ex-
pected overall travel distance, but less overall travel distance is not equivalent to a
high task allocation efficiency in some scenarios. Wang et al. [28] propose a prob-













based on obfuscated locations of users. Because it assigns each task with the user
with the largest probability of being closest to it, it is worthwhile to analyze how
to balance the acceptance rate and distribution rate.
Few studies have focused on edge/fog computing assisted MSC task alloca-
tion. In [29] fog servers are used to assist in generating bus route without the ex-
posure of users travel plans. The authors in [30] propose a road surface condition
monitoring system based on vehicular crowdsensing, where a certificateless ag-
gregate signcryption scheme is designed for privacy protection. Fo-SDD [31] uses
edge nodes to assist task allocation. Despite much more accurate and secure task
allocation for mobile users, it ignores task allocation rate and impact of different
privacy constraints. [32] is a privacy preserving reputation management scheme
for edge computing enhanced MCS to deal with malicious participants. The work
in [33] presents a distributed agent-based privacy-preserving framework (DADP),
which provides a valuable reference for designing a fog/edge assisted privacy-
preserving mechanism. Unlike DADP where a user can randomly select one agent
and upload the check-in data to the untrusted server with anonymous connection,
this work protects user privacy through obfuscation-based privacy game.
After studying related works, we realize that there is no comprehensive study
concerning maximizing task acceptance rate while reducing travel distance un-
der multiple privacy constraints against inference attacks in an edge computing
assisted environment. This drives us to purpose P2TA.
3. Motivation
We motivate this work through three case studies in this section. We first
introduce two cases for analyzing and comparing the problems of user-centric and
task-centric task allocation methods. Then, we illustrate the impact of location
obfuscation on task allocation efficiency.
3.1. Impact of User-Centric Task Allocation
The introduction of edge computing cuts off the opportunity for the CS-Server
to directly capture a user’s real location. By performing obfuscation mechanism
on edge nodes, a user’s privacy requirements can be guaranteed. Because users
tend to accept tasks with smaller travel distances, a natural step after obtaining
privacy security is to assign the closest task to each user. As a matter of fact,
such a user-centric policy may result in certain tasks not being assigned to any
one user. Fig. 1 gives an irrational task allocation resulting from the pursuit of













Fig. 1: Case study I (user-centric task allocation).
Fig. 2: Case study II (task-centric task allocation).
Task A using the above user-centric policy. Although the distance from User B
to Task B is only slightly further than that to Task A, Task B is still not assigned
to anyone. In this allocation, the user acceptance rate reaches 100%, but only one
task is assigned and the number of accepted tasks is only one. This case prompts
us to further study the impact of task allocation rate in the following section.
3.2. Impact of Task-Centric Task Allocation
For comparison, we analyze a task-centric policy that aims to maximize task
allocation rate. Take Fig. 2 as an example to illustrate to show whether this policy
is beneficial to task allocation. A common step for this case is to choose the closest
user for each task. Accordingly, Task A is assigned to User A. The user closest to
Task B is still User A. Since each user can only assign one task, a straightforward
method is to assign the next closest User B to Task B. However, the distance
between User B and Task B is 3, which is likely to cause the task to be rejected.
This case has a total of 2 tasks assigned, but only 1 task may be accepted by the
user. If Task A is assigned to User B and Task B is assigned to User A, both
tasks are likely to be accepted. These two case show that neither the maximum













Fig. 3: Case study III (task allocation after obfuscation).
task assignment effect. With this in mind, to design a more reasonable allocation
metric is necessary.
3.3. Impact of Location Obfuscation
Users are very likely to refuse to accept tasks if their privacy requirements are
not met especially when the CS-server continuously asks participants to upload
location data. However, there is a certain mutual restriction between providing
privacy guarantees and reducing travel distance. A way to design a location ob-
fuscation mechanism from the perspective of individual privacy (similar to the
method in LBSs) is likely to degrade task allocation efficiency. Take Fig. 3 as an
example. Without location obfuscation, system will assign Task A (B) to User
A (B) according to travel distances (see solid arrows). After obfuscation, system
may assign Task A (B) to User B (A) that is further away from the target (accord-
ing to each users perturbed location) than to User A (B) whose actual location is
closer to the target (see dotted arrows). Because a large number of users and tasks
coexist, it is very difficult to optimally incorporate obfuscation mechanism into
task allocation. This requires us to consider the problem of how to properly de-
compose the problem, aimed at jointly reducing unnecessary travel distance and
maintaining high privacy level.
4. System Overview
In this section, we first define all entities in our system from a real-world



















Fig. 4: System Composition.
4.1. Composition
Our system consists of three entities: the CS-server (potential attacker), edge
nodes, and mobile users, as shown in Fig. 4. The roles played by different entities
are summarized blew.
• CS-Server: The CS-Server is an MCS platform operated by a private com-
pany (such as the Amazon Mechanical Turk). Unlike the mode that inter-
acts directly with users, the CS-Server in our framework releases tasks to
edge nodes that cover the task places. It is assumed that the CS-server is
untrusted, who wants to gain access to users’ private data.
• Edge Node: An edge node exists as both an anonymous server and a task
assignment agent. On the one hand, it is in charge of aggregating received
locations and obfuscating the locations locally. On the other hand, it is
responsible for task allocation and submitting task acceptance result along
with obfuscated locations to the CS-server. In this mode, the CS-server
cannot peek into original user locations and only observe the obfuscated
user locations. In addition, users often switch between different edge nodes
during task completion, which spreads possible privacy leakage risks.
• Users: Users (workers) As users take privacy seriously, they don’t trust the
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Fig. 5: Running process of privacy-preserving task allocation
uploads their real locations and privacy requirements to edge nodes, instead
of the CS-server. Upon receiving task information, they choose to accept
or reject it. After accepting tasks, users will inform edge nodes of their IDs
along with the accepted tasks. Then, they go to the task place and uses his
or her sensing device to collect specific data.
4.2. Workflow
Suppose that the CS-server having various sensing tasks in a certain city which
needs to recruit users to conduct. The running process of the whole system can be
divided into the following steps (which correspond to the serial number in Fig. 5):
1. Task location publication on the CS-server side: The CS-server issues
application-specific task locations to edge nodes that cover the task places.
2. Data submission on the user side: Users (workers) within the coverage
area of an edge node submit their true locations and privacy requirements
to the edge node side.
3. Location obfuscation on the edge node side: After receiving the task loca-













side will be activated to collect user data within its coverage area. After
obtaining users’ real locations, the edge node side performs obfuscation op-
eration that involves in the location obfuscation module. In the case, three
black (gray) portraits are the original (perturbed) locations.
4. Obfuscated location output on the edge node side: The obfuscated loca-
tions of all users are input to a task allocation module.
5. Task allocation on the edge node side: The task allocation module assigns
tasks to proper users based on the obfuscated locations it receives.
6. Response on the user side: After receiving task place information, users
who are willing to accept the tasks (go to the task places to complete the
tasks) will inform the edge node side of their IDs. In the case diagram we
gave, two of the three users agree to accept the tasks.
7. Feedback on the edge node side: After collecting the responses from users,
the edge node submits the obfuscated locations of the users accepting the
task from two of the three users to the server along with the users IDs and
the accepted task information. As shown in the case diagram, the edge
node side only submits the obfuscated locations for two of the three users
accepting the tasks to the CS-server.
8. Inference attack on the CS-server side: Since the location obfuscation
operation runs on the edge node side, the CS-server does not know users real
locations and can only observe the obfuscated locations submitted. With
certain prior knowledge, a malicious observer on the CS-server side can
run inference attacks optimally tailored against the obfuscation function to
minimize inference error.
It should be noted that as for the edge node side, the reason for assigning
tasks based on obfuscated locations (rather than real locations) is to prevent real
locations from being inferred by the attacker once the task allocation rules are
exposed. The specific details will be introduced later.
5. Optimal Task Assignment Problem
As the focus is on location obfuscation and task allocation mechanisms in
which the options are decided independently on by each edge node user without
knowledge about other edge nodes in the system, we limit our model and analysis
in a single edge node in the remainder of the paper, without loss of generality.
In this section, we first describe the problem to be solved. Then we explain the













Table 1: Main Notations and Variables
Symbols Definition
η task acceptance rate
α user acceptance rate
β task allocation rate
A number of task accepted
Ru set of possible user locations
r user’s actual location
R set of possible obfuscation output
r′ obfuscation output of r by an edge node
r̂ attacker’s estimate of actual location r
Rt set of task locations
rt location of task to be allocated
du user’s maximum acceptable travel distance
π(r) probability distribution over values of r
p(r′|r) probability of replacing r with r′
q(r̂|r′) probability of estimating r̂ as true location with r′
d(r, rt) travel distance between r and rt
d(r, r̂) estimation error between r and r̂
x(rt|r′) probability of allocating a task at rt to a user at r′
Finally, we mathematically formulate the proposed problem. The main notations
and variables used are listed in Table 1.
5.1. Problem Statement
Consider a scenario where users move in a urban area that is uniformly par-
titioned into discrete regions which represent the locations where users may stay
or receive/perform tasks. Each region represents a location of minimum particle
size. When the region size is small enough, the precision requirement of task as-
signment can be satisfied. It is assumed that each region is covered by one edge
node that performs obfuscation-based privacy protection mechanism.
To better understand our problem, we give the following definitions.
Definition 1 (Task Acceptance Rate). Task acceptance rate η is the proportion of

















where A is the number of accepted tasks and T is the total number of tasks deter-
mined by MCS perception requirements.
Definition 2 (User Acceptance Rate). User acceptance rate α is the ratio of the
number of users that accept the assigned task to the total number of users for each





where X is the number of users who accept the allocated tasks and U is the total
number of users.
Definition 3 (Task Allocation Rate). Task allocation rate β is the proportion of






where C is the number of tasks assigned to at least one user and T is the total
number of tasks.
Under the constraints of privacy and location perturbation (the metrics of
which will be introduced later), the effectiveness of task allocation depends largely
on how many tasks are accepted. Let at be 1 if a task at target location rt can be






which determines the user acceptance rate that can be achieved.
Fig. 6 shows the dependencies among different metrics to be considered to
achieve the above goal, where the arrow direction indicates that one indicator has
an effect on the other. For instance, η is jointly determined by α and β. Looking
back in the direction of the arrow, we can see that there are two ways to improve α.
The first is to protect users’ privacy through obfuscation mechanism p, such that
the error between estimated location r̂ and real region r is ensured under attack
function q. The other is to reduce travel distance between r and assigned task
location rt, in which task allocation function x constrains the lower bound of β.
5.2. Location Obfuscation
As a precondition for task acceptance, users want to protect their location in-


















Fig. 6: Dependencies in task assignment problem.
each edge node produces a general obfuscation function that perturbs each true
user location r ∈ Ru by replacing it with an obfuscated location r′ ∈ R. Instead
of the actual location, the obfuscated location will eventually be uploaded to the
CS-server. Given a real location r, the observable r′ is chosen according to the
following probability distribution.
p (r′ |r ) = Pr {R = r′ |Ru = r} (5)
This function is not only the key to satisfy different privacy requirements, but also
partially determines the effect of task allocation.
5.3. Inference Attack
We assume that the attacker aims at inferring a user’s real locations that can
minimize a user’s privacy by observing the output of obfuscation function. Given
any observation r′, the estimate of true location r is determined by the following
probability distribution function over all possible results involved in Ru.
q (r̂ |r′ ) = Pr {Ru = r̂ |R = r′} (6)
It is also assumed that the attacker knows the logic of obfuscation algorithm
performed on edge nodes, and he also knows the profile of user location (denoted













can perform Bayesian inference attack (similar to [34]) to infer r with r′ by
q (r̂ |r′ ) = p (r
′ |r̂ ) · π (r̂)∑
r∈R
π (r) · p (r′ |r ) (7)
This function estimates a real location r by inverting a given obfuscation mech-
anism p when r′ is released/observed. The estimation error of r̂ to r reflects the
effectiveness of inference attack, which will be explained latter. Confronted with
such an inference attack, a natural step for obfuscation mechanism is to reorient
probability distribution p to ensure user’s privacy. The two sides form a mutual
constraint.
5.4. Privacy Constraints
Differential privacy (reflecting indistinguishability [35]) and distortion pri-
vacy (reflecting estimation error [36]) are introduced to measure user privacy gain
against posterior inference.
The basic idea behind differential privacy is that suppose the obfuscated loca-
tion is r′, for any two locations r1 and r2, their probability of being mapped to r′
are similar. For a user u at r′, the CS-server cannot distinguish whether a user is at
r1 or r2 even if the CS-server knows the internal implementation of p. It formally
shows such similarity between any two locations r1 and r2 for arbitrary r′.
Let ε denote privacy budget associated with the minimum desired privacy of
a user. The smaller the value of ε, the higher the privacy. Here we use a generic
differential privacy metric. An obfuscation mechanism satisfies ε-differential-
privacy, if inequality
p (r′ |r1 ) ≤ eε·d(r1,r2) · p (r′ |r2 ) (8)
holds for all locations r, r′ ∈ S (where d(r1, r2) is the distance between r1 and
r2 reflecting the intuition that if r1 and r2 are close to each other), they should be
more indistinguishable.
After r′ is observed, the attacker can get an estimate value r̂ about original
location r through inference function q. The distance between r and r̂, i.e. d(r, r̂),
is used to quantify the inference error (referred as distortion) between r and r̂
which reflects the attacker’s inference error of an obfuscated region. Specifically,
the greater the distortion privacy, the lower the attack effect of q, and the lower
users worry about r ∼ p(r′|r) becoming exposed. The user’s distortion privacy













q, for a specific location r can be calculated by
∑
r′∈R
p (r′ |r )
∑
r̂∈R
q (r̂ |r′ ) · d (r, r̂) (9)
With prior leakage π(r) which reflects the priori exposed information about r,






p (r′ |r )
∑
r̂∈R
q (r̂ |r′ ) · d (r, r̂) (10)
which represents the expected inference error between r and r̂. The decision-
making of obfuscation mechanism based on distortion and differential privacy
can limit possible privacy leaks.
5.5. Task Allocation Rule
Denoted by d(r, rt) the travel distance between a user’s real region r and his
or her assigned task location rt. If travel distance is too long for a user, he or she
will probably be unwilling to conduct the task. For an MCS organizer, long travel
distance may lead to unsatisfactory conditions such as high incentive to pay and
large sensing delay. Consequently, travel distance is inversely proportional to the
user acceptance rate, inspired by which the user acceptance rate (defined in (2))





where k is a constant to reflect the relationship between user acceptance rate and
travel distance. Because participants in different regions have different sensitivity
to travel distance, the value of k can be set via an analysis of user profile.
If obfuscated region r′ is released, the assignment of a task toward target place
rt follows probability distribution function x.
x (rt |r′ ) = Pr {Rt = rt |Ru = r′} (12)
where the principle is to ensure that the CS-server cannot infer a user’s real lo-
cation through x. The upper limit of η is determined by β. A natural way is to
improve β by limiting x as
∑
r′∈R













such that the condition that each task is allocated to at least one user can be guar-
anteed.
Depending on allocation probability function x, the expected travel distance





p (r′ |r ) · x (rt |r′ ) · d (r, rt) (14)
This metric will be used to measure whether the user can accept the given task.
Intuitively, because the CS-server cannot acquire users’ real locations, an edge
node seems to be able to assign tasks to users according to their real locations, and
then submit the obfuscated location to the CS-server. This will not only improve
the efficiency of task assignment but also protects user privacy. If we follow this
rule, the task allocation function will change from x(rt|r′) to x(rt|r). The attacker
can infer original location r as long as he knows the implementation of x(rt|r).
In view of this situation, an edge node needs to perform task assignment with the
locations after treatment.
5.6. Problem Formulation
The optimal task allocation aims to maximize η, equivalent to maximizing the
number of accepted tasks. The privacy protection effect with obfuscation function
p is constrained by differential privacy, while the accuracy of inference attack with
function q is measured by distortion privacy.
The travel travel (cost) of completing a task is taken into account. Let du de-
note user’s maximum acceptable travel distance, i.e. the task will be accepted as
long as d(r, rt) ≤ du. Worth noting that if the target is assigned by merely min-
imizing d(r, rt), not only will the user’s privacy be leaked, but also the task that
is easy to complete is assigned multiple times or the task that is difficult to com-
plete cannot be assigned. From a global perspective, we use regional obfuscation
function p and assignment probability function x to calculate expected travel dis-
tance (defined in (14)) to more objectively reflect the user’s expectation of whether
the task is acceptable. Let random variable ar be 1 if the task is expected to be
accepted, otherwise be 0. Accordingly, the joint location obfuscation and task





























p (r′ |r ) · x (rt |r′ ) · d(r, rt) ≥ du − ξ · (1− at) (17)
at ∈ {0, 1} , ∀rt ∈ Rt (18)
p (r′ |r ) ≥ 0,
∑
r′∈R
p (r′ |r ) = 1, ∀r ∈ Ru,∀r′ ∈ R (19)
p (r′ |r1 ) ≤ eε·d(r1,r2) · p (r′ |r2 ) ,∀r1, r2 ∈ Ru,∀r′ ∈ R (20)
∑
r∈Ru
π (r) · p (r′ |r ) = π (r′) (21)
q (r̂ |r′ ) ≥ 0,
∑
r̂∈R
q (r̂ |r′ ) = 1,∀r′, r̂ ∈ R (22)
∑
r′∈R
p (r′ |r )
∑
r̂∈R
q (r̂ |r′ ) · d (r, r̂) ≥ dm (23)
x (rt |r′ ) ≥ 0,
∑
rt∈Rt
x (rt |r′ ) = 1, ∀rt ∈ Rt,∀r′ ∈ R (24)
∑
r′∈R
x (rt |r′ ) · U ≥ 1,∀rt ∈ Rt (25)
Before task allocation, an edge node collects all user locations (stored in set
Ru) and receives task locations (stored in set Rt) from the CS-server. Then, the
edge node attempts to maximize objective (15) i.e. the number of tasks accepted
while satisfying constraints. The essence of this problem is to find the solution of
obfuscation and task allocation, both of which are mutual-depend as a whole.
By setting constraints (16) and (17), we establish an association between 0-1
variable at and decisions, which can reflect the impact of all possible decisions on




























With this rule, the number of task accepted can be updated after each decision,
while ensuring that travel distances are within acceptable limits for the user.
Constraint (18) limits at to be 0 or 1. Constraint (19) states probability distri-
butions for obfuscation function p. Constraint (20) guarantees user’s differential
privacy. Constraint (21) aims to limit location perturbation, ensuring that P2TA
does not change the overall region distribution of users; in other words, the user
location distribution after confusion of p is the same as the original user location
distribution. Similar to (19), constraint (22) ensures that inference function q is
proper. Constraint (23) guarantees a user’s distortion privacy, where dm is the
threshold a user can tolerate. Constraint (24) states probability distribution repre-
sented by function x for task assignment. Constraint (25) ensures that any task is
assigned at least once.
The LOTA problem consists of two intertwined subproblem regarding privacy
protection and task allocation. When the number of participants and the number
of tasks are large, it difficult to quickly find optimal solution. If we perform enu-
meration, the computational complexity of enumerating all possible p, q and x
will at least reach O(n4), where n is the number of regions in which the cover-
age area of an edge node is divided. To improve practicality, a natural step is to
decompose the LOTA problem and solve the different functions separately.
6. Solution: Problem Decomposition
We decompose the LOTA problem to get a suboptimal solution. We first ex-
tract location obfuscation subproblem against inference attack (associated with p
and q) from the LOTA problem and model it as a privacy game problem with con-
sideration of better task allocation. We then solve the task allocation subproblem
(associated with x) according to the obfuscated locations.
6.1. Location Obfuscation Subproblem
Because p and q are with opposite objectives, the location obfuscation sub-
problem can be formalized as a privacy game between the defender (on the edge
node side) and the attacker (on the CS-server side) to quantify privacy-preserving
effect. A genetic algorithm based policy is introduced to get a suboptimal solution
for location obfuscation.
6.1.1. Privacy Game Model
The privacy-preserving issue can be regarded as a kind of Stackelberg game













and the other players, the CS-server, selfishly chooses its best response strategy q∗
against strategy p∗. The goal of such a game is to find the pair of the best strategies
p∗ and q∗ mutually optimal against each other.
For any user location r ∈ Ru, the decision space is the set of observables R.
For any observable r′ ∈ R, the strategic space of the attacker is all possible at-
tackers estimates ŝ ∈ S. A mixed policy is designed for a given location r ∈ Ru
via a vector {p (r1′ |ri ) , p (r2′ |ri ) , ..., p (rn′ |ri )}, where {r′1, r′2, ..., r′n} = R.
Correspondingly, for a given observable r′ ∈ R, there is a mixed policy for
the attacker expressed by a vector {q (r̂1 |ri′ ) , q (r̂2 |ri′ ) , ..., q (r̂n |ri′ )}, where
{r̂1, r̂2, ..., r̂n} = R. Both vectors represent the conditional distribution functions
associated with an location obfuscation function for a true location r and an in-
ference attack function for an observable r′. Let P denote the sets of all mixed
policies of an edge node for a user. The decision space about obfuscation proba-
bility distribution p is expressed as
P = {p (r1′ |ri ) , p (r2′ |ri ) , ..., p (rn′ |ri )} ,
p (r′ |r ) ≥ 0,
∑
r′∈R
p (r′ |r ) = 1, ∀r ∈ Ru,∀r′ ∈ R (26)
Let Q denote the sets of all mixed policies of the attacker, whose decision space
about inference probability distribution q is defined as
Q = {q (r̂1 |ri′ ) , q (r̂2 |ri′ ) , ..., q (r̂n |ri′ )} ,
q (r̂ |r′ ) ≥ 0, ∑
r̂∈R
q (r̂ |r′ ) = 1,∀r′, r̂ ∈ R (27)
The optimal strategy for the CS-server is to minimize error of the adver-






π (r) · p∗ (r′ |r ) · q (r̂ |r′ ) · d (r, r̂) (28)
Subject to:
q (r̂ |r′ ) ≥ 0,
∑
r̂∈R
q (r̂ |r′ ) = 1,∀r′, r̂ ∈ R (29)
∑
r′,r̂∈R













The optimal strategy for an edge node is to maximize the expected inference





p (r′ |r )
∑
r̂∈R
q∗ (r̂ |r′ ) · d (r, r̂) (31)
Subject to:
p (r′ |r ) ≥ 0,
∑
r′∈R
p (r′ |r ) = 1,∀r ∈ Ru,∀r′ ∈ R (32)
p (r′ |r1 ) ≤ eεd(r1,r2)p (r′ |r2 ) , ∀r1, r2 ∈ Ru,∀r′ ∈ R (33)
∑
r∈Ru
π (r) · p (r′ |r ) = π (r′) (34)
∑
r′,r̂∈R
π (r) · p (r′ |r ) · q∗ (r̂ |r′ ) · d (r, r̂) ≥ dm (35)
If we enumerate all possible combinations of p and q, the computational com-
plexity will reachO(n3). In a real-world scenario, the value of n tends to be larger,
which leads to higher complexity. An iteration algorithm is designed to quickly
approximate the optimal solution. The basic idea is that the solution to p (or q)
can be seen as the input of q (or p), and the p and q are alternatively solved until
convergence (or the iteration times exceed a given threshold). Next, we explain
the implementation details of the algorithm.
6.1.2. GA based Initialization
To start the iteration of solving p and q, an initial p, denoted as p0, is needed
to be set. The use of iteration algorithm often leads to a local optimal solution,
where the selection of p0 affects how good the local optimal solution can achieve.
In order to make the game not fall into local convergence early, Genetic Algo-
rithm (GA) [39] is introduced for selecting an initial value. The key idea behind
GA is to generate a potential solution for utility testing from existing solutions by
using either Mutation or Crossover methods under a given probability. The Mu-
tation and Crossover processes are designed for solving p&q-subproblem, mainly
consisting of two steps as follows.
Mutation maintains diversity within a population and prevents premature con-
vergence. Take Fig. 7 as an example of a randomly generated regional confusion
matrix p0 mutated into p1. Given a pre-obtained p0, a location pair (r1,r2) be-














Fig. 7: Mutation example.
p p
Fig. 8: Crossover example.
p0(r1, r2)/2 and by setting p1(r3, r2) to p0(r3r2) + p0(r1, r2)/2. The remaining
values are consistent with the values of the same position in p0.
Crossover selects a pair of matched parents and then randomly selects a set of
intersections to exchange genes to produce offspring. We present a case in Fig. 8
where the genes (corresponding to one row of the matrix) of the two randomly
generated location confusion matrices p10 and p
2
0 perform such an operation. Given
the parents p10 and p
2
0, the crossover function is used to generate two children p
1
1
and p21 by row exchange. More specifically, an edge node randomly selects a
location r and then sets p11 (:, r) to p
2
0 (:, r) and p
2
1 (:, r) to p
1
0 (:, r); for the rest




1 is set to p
2
0.
The aim about crossover and mutation is to adjust the probability that an obfus-
cated location r is assigned to target task location rt. The sum of the probability of
each row is equal to one after the transformation. Different from [25] which uses
the GA to adjust the number of tasks assigned, we use the same way to achieve













between the defender and the attacker in such a privacy game.
6.2. Task Allocation Subproblem
After generating the obfuscation function, an edge node next needs to actu-
ally allocate tasks in accordance with the obfuscated locations. We refer to the
follow-up problem as task allocation decision subproblem aimed at maximizing
task acceptance rate. Since only task allocation function x needs to be solved,


















p∗ (r′ |r )x (rt |r′ ) d (rt |r ) ≥ du − ξ · (1− at) (38)
at ∈ {0, 1} , ∀rt ∈ Rt (39)
∑
r′∈R
x (rt |r′ ) · U ≥ 1,∀rt ∈ Rt (40)
x (rt |r′ ) ≥ 0,
∑
rt∈Rt
x (rt |r′ ) = 1,∀rt ∈ Rt,∀r′ ∈ R (41)
The above subproblem can be transformed into a simple integer programming
problem, where x becomes the only one that needs to be solved. It can be effi-
ciently solved with off-the-shelf linear optimization software. After tasks are as-
signed according to function x, an edge node collects the IDs of users that accepts
the tasks, and then submits it to the CS-server along with the their obfuscated loca-
tions. Even if the attacker knows the implementation of task assignment function,
he cannot directly guess the true location of a user.
7. Performance Evaluation
This section conducts performance analysis and evaluation of our proposed













Table 2: Key parameters in simulation.
Notation Default Description
n 36 number of regions in edge node coverage
U 30 number of users
T 10 number of tasks to be assigned
ε 0.3 differential privacy requirement
dm 1 distortion privacy requirement
du 1.5km acceptable travel distance
π uniform user spatial distribution
τ uniform task spatial distribution
covered area is divided into n regions, the set of which corresponds to R. The
default parameter settings for the details are given in Table 2.
For comparison, a differential obfuscation task allocation mechanism pro-
posed in [25] is chosen as a baseline, where the focus is on minimizing users’
total travel distance under differential privacy constraints. A No-Privacy scheme
is also introduced as an unconstrained optimal task allocation scheme compared
to P2TA and baseline. It is the optimal scheme that uses the real locations for task
assignment (equivalent to P2TA without privacy constraints).
Three experiments are designed to study the effect of task assignment from
three aspects, including impact of privacy constraints, (acceptable) travel distance
and number of participants. In order to improve the accuracy of result data, all
the data presented includes the average of multiple random experiments. The
performance metrics to be examined includes: 1) privacy level (defined as the
proportion of the number of accepted tasks that satisfy privacy constraints among
all the accepted tasks), 2) task acceptance rate η, 3) user acceptance rate α and 4)
task allocation rate β.
7.1. Impact of Privacy Constraints
Experiment I looks at the effect of privacy constraints on privacy level. The
privacy level is defined as the proportion of the number of tasks that satisfy the
constraint among all the assigned tasks. We adjust parameters ε and dm (defined
in (8) and (23)) to reflect the change in the rigor of the constraints. The results
shown in Fig. 9 are divided into four parts.
Fig. 9(a) depicts the effect of parameter ε on the average privacy level. It can
be seen that the average privacy level of both P2TA and baseline increases with the

































































































(c) travel distance (d) task acceptance rate













between the user’s real locations and the confused locations, and the easier it is
to meet the privacy requirement. The baseline’s average privacy level is always
higher than P2TA because it does not consider distortion privacy; in other words,
P2TA’s distortion privacy constraint dm is set to 1km, and such a stricter privacy
constraint reduces the proportion of task assignments that satisfy the requirement.
Nonetheless, while providing greater privacy protection, P2TA’s average privacy
level is only about 5% lower than baseline, indicating the adaptability and usabil-
ity of the mechanism.
The effect of parameter dm on the average privacy level of P2TA under differ-
ent ε conditions is shown in Fig. 9(b). The larger the value of dm, the greater the
average privacy level. The reason for this is that the distortion privacy constraint
dm is related to the attacker’s expected inference error. The larger the value is, the
less accurate the attacker’s estimate of a user’s real position is, and the higher the
privacy protection strength is. In our experiments, the coverage of one edge node
is set to 3km × 3km. Limited by the coverage, the proportion of tasks that can
satisfy constraints decreases rapidly especially when dm is larger than 1km.
In Fig. 9(c) we then show whether different average privacy levels have an im-
pact on the user’s travel distance. When privacy level is low, the distribution range
of travel distance tends to expand and the average travel distance increases. This is
because the lower privacy level (more tasks do not meet privacy constraints) leads
to increased randomness of task assignment results. As privacy level increases,
the number of abnormal points shows an increasing trend. The main reasons in-
clude three aspects. First, because our method reduces the travel distance under
the premise of protecting privacy, there is a certain probability that a relatively
distant task will be assigned. Second, the optimization goal of this work is not to
minimize the travel distance, so an edge node may try to assign some tasks that are
further away from users in order to improve the task acceptance rate. Third, the
high Privacy level is good for improving the task assignment, and thus the travel
distance may be classified as an abnormal point. These factors make the number
of abnormal points more frequent when privacy level is high.
Fig. 9(d) compares task acceptance rate η and user acceptance rate α of P2TA
under three different strictness levels of privacy constraints. It can be seen that
both η and α are maintained at the lowest level under the most relaxed privacy
constraints (dm = 0.5 and ε = 0.5). This is because when privacy is threatened,
users will refuse to participate in group intelligence perception. Under the most
stringent privacy constraints (dm = 1.5 and = 0.1), η and α also perform poorly
due to strict privacy constraints resulting in lower privacy levels. It is worth noting





























































(a) user acceptance rate (b) task acceptance rate
Fig. 10: Impact of distance Factors (Experiment II)
higher than 60%. Such parameter settings are a good balance between privacy
protection and task assignment efficiency.
7.2. Impact of Distance Factors
The purpose of next experiment is to analyze the impact on performance ex-
erted by the increase in travel distance (required to complete the task) and accept-
able travel distance (from the perspective of a user).
Form Fig. 10(a), as the travel distance increases, user acceptance rate α drops
sharply and P2TA always keeps a higher α than baseline. This is because the
optimization goal of baseline is minimum overall travel distance which cannot
reflect α well in some cases. For instance, there are two users only willing to
travel 500m. If it assigns a task with a distance of 600 meters to each of them, no
tasks will be accepted. Nevertheless, if a user is assigned a task with a distance
of 500m and another user is assigned a task with a distance of 1000m, α will be
50%, even though the overall travel distance is not the minimum.
Unlike the travel distance in Fig. 10(a), the acceptance travel distance in Fig. 10(b)
refers to the travel distance acceptable to the user. The longer the acceptable travel
distance of a user (the longer the travel distance a user is willing to travel), the
greater the task acceptance rate (the more likely he or she is to accept a task). As
we can see, there is a rapid growth in task acceptance rate η with the increasing of
user’s acceptability on travel distance. In particular, η of P2TA is always higher
























































(a) task allocation rate (b) user acceptance rate























(c) task acceptance rate
Fig. 11: Impact of user number (Experiment III)
7.3. Impact of Number of Participants
In Experiment III, the effect of number of participant is explored. The results
on η, α and β are shown in Fig. 11.
Fig. 11(a) gives the η with respect to different number of users. As can be
concluded from the figure, the β of P2TA remains 100%, which is independent
of the number of users. This is because task allocation probability distribution x
satisfies a constraint that each task is assigned at least once. Since the number of
tasks needs to be assigned remains unchanged, the probability of having an allo-
cable user near each task increases. This makes β achieved by baseline increase
gradually and close to P2TA after the number of users reaches 30.
The variation of α in different number of users by each scheme is shown in
Fig. 11(b). When the number of users is low, baseline’s α is higher than a non-













cation constraint, which allows P2TA to assign non-nearest tasks to users. The
purpose of this allocation strategy is to increase β to improve η. When the num-
ber of users increased, α achieved by baseline begins to be lower than that of
P2TA. This is because baseline equalizes the overall travel distance to task accep-
tance rate. When the number of users is large enough, the overall travel distance
becomes not able to accurately reflect η.
According to Fig. 11(c), the task acceptance rate under varying number of
users with respect to different allocation schemes shows an increase when the
user number changes from 10 to 40. P2TA can provide higher η than baseline.
It is comparable to No-Privacy scheme after the number of users is exceeds 30.
This is because P2TA jointly considers α and β, while baseline only optimizes the
overall travel distance. In summary, P2TA can provide a higher task acceptance
rate along with better privacy protection effect compared with baseline.
8. Conclusion
A privacy-preserving task allocation (P2TA) framework is designed for edge
computing enhanced MCS. The goal is to maximize task acceptance rate while
satisfying privacy and location perturbation constraints. While the introduction of
edge nodes improve real-time performance of task allocation, it can cut off op-
portunities for the CS-server to directly obtain users’ location data. We solve the
joint privacy protection and task allocation problem by means of problem decom-
position. A privacy game model is built to optimize defender/attacker objectives
against each other to obtain a final obfuscation strategy which can be immune
to posterior inference. To address the game problem, a genetic algorithm is per-
formed to choose an initial obfuscation strategy, building upon which an edge
node maximizes the number of tasks accepted under constraints of differential
privacy and distortion privacy. Simulation results demonstrate that compared with
the typical MCS task allocation mechanism, P2TA achieves significant perfor-
mance improvement of task acceptance rate with higher privacy level.
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